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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1759 
___________ 
 
DAVE WILLIAMS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DR. B. JIN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:15-cv-00855) 
District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 8, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 14, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 In this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Dave Williams, a 
prisoner at SCI-Greene who is proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment and denying his motion for partial summary judgment.  
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm. 
 In his complaint, Williams alleged that Dr. Byunghak Jin, the medical director at 
SCI-Greene, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to adequately treat a right 
inguinal hernia.  Williams first complained about the hernia in May 2011.1  Dr. Jin 
examined Williams and concluded that the hernia was easily reducible, instructed him 
about how to manage it, and indicated that he should be reevaluated in one year.  On 
December 30, 2011, Williams appeared at sick call and was examined by the attending 
physician, Dr. Park, who concluded that Williams’ hernia was sagging into his scrotum.  
Accordingly, Dr. Park recommended that Williams be referred to Dr. Jin to discuss 
surgery.  On January 5, 2012, Dr. Jin examined Williams, noted that the hernia was 
reducible and small in size, and ordered Williams to wear a hernia strap for six months.  
Williams received the hernia strap on January 9, 2012.  On April 24, 2012, Williams 
reported that the hernia strap had broken, but he was provided with a replacement on May 
2, 2012.  On July 16, 2012, Williams appeared at sick call and complained that the hernia 
                                              
1 In April 2007, Williams had surgery to repair a left inguinal hernia.  At a follow-up 
appointment approximately one week later, the surgeon noted that Williams might have a 
“small right inguinal hernia,” which could require more surgery pro re nata (as needed).  
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had not improved.  Although the record does not indicate what treatment Williams 
received at that time, he did not seek additional care for his hernia until February 2013, 
when he sought and received a renewal of his hernia strap prescription.  In April 2014, 
Williams appeared at sick call and complained that the renewed hernia strap was too big.  
A physician’s assistant exchanged the strap for a smaller one, noting that Williams  “was 
in no acute distress and that he stated that he was not in any pain.”  In January 2015, a 
physician’s assistant examined Williams, who complained about the hernia and asked 
about surgery.  The physician’s assistant noted that Williams’ hernia was reducible and 
advised him to continue wearing the strap.  In April 2015, Dr. Jin noted that Williams 
still had the hernia, renewed Williams’s hernia strap, and indicated that the hernia was 
self-reducing through use of the strap.   
 Williams filed his complaint in July 2015.  Dr. Jin filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that the evidence demonstrated that Williams received regular and 
appropriate treatment.  After a review of the summary judgment record, a Magistrate 
Judge recommended that Dr. Jin’s summary judgment motion be granted because 
Williams did not adduce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.  
Over Williams’ objections, the District Court granted summary judgment to Dr. Jin and 
denied Williams’ motion for partial summary judgment.  Williams appealed.   
                                                                                                                                                  
Williams’ complaint does not appear to challenge the treatment he received for the left 
inguinal hernia.   
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s order is plenary.  See Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 812 F.3d 319, 327-28 (3d Cir. 
2016).  Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 
422-23 (3d Cir. 2006).  We may summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the 
appeal does not raise a substantial question.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for the denial or delay of medical 
care, Williams is required to demonstrate that Dr. Jin was deliberately indifferent to his 
serious medical needs.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976).  Deliberate 
indifference can be shown by a prison official’s “intentionally denying or delaying access 
to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”  Id. at 
104-05.  Allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a constitutional 
violation.  White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990).  Furthermore, “mere 
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” does not support a claim of an Eighth 
Amendment violation.  Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 
(3d Cir. 1987).  
 It is clear from the record that Williams received timely and adequate medical 
attention when he complained about the right inguinal hernia.  The undisputed medical 
records demonstrate that Dr. Jin, pursuant to his professional judgment, tailored 
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Williams’ treatment to his symptoms.  Williams’ disagreement with the treatment is 
insufficient to establish deliberate indifference.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 
(3d Cir. 2004).  Williams did not present any evidence from which a reasonable juror 
could conclude that Dr. Jin intentionally refused to provide needed treatment, delayed 
necessary treatment for a non-medical reason, prevented Williams from receiving 
required treatment, or persisted in a particular course of treatment “in the face of resultant 
pain and risk of permanent injury.”  Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109-11 (3d Cir. 1990)).  Accordingly, the 
District Court properly granted Dr. Jin’s motion for summary judgment.  See Johnson v. 
Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1014 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming District Court determination 
that using hernia belt for reducible inguinal hernia did not constitute deliberate 
indifference).   
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no substantial question 
presented by this appeal, and will thus summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
 
